Jorge Larrosa is professor of philosophy of education at the University of Barcelona, \u200b\u200bSpain. Conducted postdoctoral studies at the Institute of Education, University of London and the Centre Michel Foucault at the Sorbonne in Paris. Among his books are Education secular liberation of freedom and between languages. Language and Education after Babel. Among his numerous books and magazine compilations include Journeys, deeds, metamorphosis: the idea of \u200b\u200btraining in the novel, let me tell you: Essays on fiction and education, Images of the other, Les livres, les voyages, l'education, Theory of communicative passion, Camino and metaphor: essays on aesthetics and training and lessons ignorant.
Larry has also edited a selection of didactic works of María Zambrano entitled L'art de les Mediations.
Some works of Jorge Larrosa
The experience of reading. Literature Studies and Training (Laertes 1996, 3 rd edition revised and augmented in FCE 2003, 2007) Pedagogy
Profana. Essays on language, subjectivity and education (News Education 2000)
Among the languages. Language and education after Babel (Laertes 2003).
preface the reading experience of Jorge Larrosa, edition of FCE, 2007.
Reading is at the beginning and end of the study. Reading and the desire for reading. The The study sought is reading, reading delay, to extend and deepen the reading, come, perhaps, to a reading of their own. Study: reading with an open notebook and pencil in hand, heading to their own reading. Knowing that this road has no end or purpose. Knowing well that the experience of reading is infinite and inappropriate. Endlessly.
And also, the writing and the desire of writing are at the beginning and end of the study. What we want is the study of writing, the delay in writing, reaching, perhaps, the writing itself. Study: write, through a table full of books, writing own way. Although this path has no end or purpose. Knowing that the experience of writing is also infinite and inappropriate. Endlessly.
(...)
studying, trying to learn to read what you can not read yet. And you try to learn to write what you know not yet written. (...). Live study of words and words. (...) Read and write is to explore what can be done with words and what words can do with you. The study is all about words.
(...)
study is also asking. The questions are the passion of the study. And his strength. And his breath. And his rhythm. And his stubbornness. In the study, reading and writing are interrogative. Studying is read by asking, go, interrogated, in other words. And also write questions. Rehearse what happens to your own words when you type in question here. Asking. And asking them to them.
(...)
Questions studying passion: reading and writing of the study. Questions open the reading and catch fire. The questions in the writing, and make it glow.
study is to insert everything you read and everything you write in space burning questions.
Jorge Larrosa. The experience of reading. Mexico. Fondo de Cultura Economica. 2007, pp. 12-20.
BE AND LANGUAGE. HEIDEGGER
In a series of lectures at the University of Freiburg in December 1957 and February 1958 entitled The essence of speech 15 reason Heidegger takes as a verse Stefan George which reads: "nothing is there a lack of the word." Through careful consideration that takes as its starting point what are the words, what things are and what are the names as a form of words that have a particular relationship with things, Heidegger is expanding and transforming the meaning of the verse to make the bearer of another and the same sense: "one is given where it breaks the word."
In a first move, Heidegger interprets the phrase as a enunciaci George on of which is the word and essentially the name that gives being to the thing "the essence of everything that is lies in the word. Hence the validity of the sentence, the language is the house of being. " 16 From this point of view, the relationship between words and things is a connection between "thing" on one side and "word" of another, but is the word that establishes the relationship ie "the word itself is the relationship in each instance retains the thing itself so that 'is' a thing." 11 Word and essentially name is a signifier that is superimposed on a meaning,
is not a means of re-presentation ng t understood as a present fray what you are and to advance as a thing to us, but it is the word that does come to
presence to things. And that do come to the present is just a donation ng be, the donation of the conditions under which something can appear as what it is.
The hip ótesis Heidegger's ontological, whereby it is word that gives being to the thing, is up here í consistent with hermeneutic ontology according to which no to is the language being outside. From this point of view, the language aje is source of being in the way things appear to stop things as they are and let them be present. Heidegger states this hip ótesis ontological in his glosses the verse of George, for example: "'thing' called here any entity that is somehow present. Moreover, we said about of the 'word' s not nly was in its relationship with the thing, but the word is what first brings this thing, so that entity, to this' is', that word is what keeps it there, the claims and, as t say it, provides the livelihoods to be something " 18 , and in another place:" ... 'where nothing is missing the word' points to the relation between word and thing, so that the word itself is the relationship while holding all things into being and keeps it there. Without the word thus retains all the things, the 'world' would sink into the dark including the ' I' ". 19 The world is illuminated and is not depressed in the dark because no word. And the human being as being-in-the-world, as inserted in this enlightened world and sustained in her heart for the word, you get the condition of possibility for that word which is "house of being." Language is not (only) thing to mund but not state of the world, and not (only) owned by me, but his condition. Moreover, given the historicity and plurality of language, its ontological dimension is its ability to open not the world but a world, and to allow me but not a self, a particular mode of subjectivity historically and culturally determined.
to here í Heideggerian position is clearly inconsistent with the analysis the artwork as "laying of the truth" 20 because the truth is no longer proposing correspondence with reality (and, therefore, the connection between word and thing), but more fundamentally, the opening of horizons of meaning within which it is possible the verification of propositions. It is also consistent with the reason holderliniano repeatedly used by Heidegger, that of "what remains is founded poets, 21 in the sense that poetic language (as native language) set the original familiarity with the world is the condition of experience.
But m ore than later, at the end of the second conference on "The essence of speech", Heidegger opens up a different question: not because of the relationship between word and thing or the way the given word (or cover, or houses, or hold) the essence of the thing, but being itself a word. The starting point of the argument is that if the word is, she must also be a thing, since "anything" means anything that is in some way. We find then in the situation where one thing, the word, is what gives it being something else, the object. To common sense, indeed, language is one thing between things: the words are seen and heard, are chosen and used, you can sort, organize, analyze, compose and decompose. But the concern is that when it is language that speaks (and not that of what is spoken) language is not something . Heidegger says clearly: "... the word, which itself is not anything, no thing 'is', we miss " 22 or a little later, even more clearly:" ... the word, ie not to be. " 23
same overlap between a word that is one thing and one word, not being one thing, gives being to things (the world, to me, the language itself as a thing we have and we use) is stated in another place since the distinction between the given and what gives: "If we think rightly, can never say a word: it is, but, she gives, not sense that 'are given' words, but as soon as the word itself that day. The word: the donor. What makes a gift? According to the poetic experience as the oldest tradition of thought, the word is given: the self. Then, thinking duty íamos search the 'it gives' the word as the donor herself, without her ever given. " 24 Language "and s" when it comes to , when given, when we can represent us as existing, when we can use it as something that is as an instrument of our property . But when language speaks, speaks a language that we slide, we are denied, we dissolve, we mysterious and makes us uneasy. When it is language that speaks not we who have the language but the language that has us. So "... speech is not simply a human capacity. " 25 And language is no longer than thought, but what makes one wonder.
occurs in language as a kind of duplicaci ng as we deem as a thing (or as an option) or as a condition of being of things, as such a condition, not is anything that is not given or not be. Occurs as a kind of empirical-transcendental doublet in which the transcendental dimension of language (meaning "transcendental" in the Kantian sense, as a condition of possibility of experience) is not a priori and necessary, but radically historical, finite and contingent. The language is a finite historical horizon, never completely knowable and determinable except as such horizon, so to speak of an "event" of truth or be like "event." Therefore, as Heidegger indicates in passing opening your text to paths unknown to be traveled by Heidegger and Derrida heterodox, "a sudden glow illuminates the relationship between death and talks but is even without thinking. " 26
And now we are able to make sense of the modification ng Heidegger proposes in the back of George, that that means "anything is where missing word " by " a is given where it breaks the word. " Breaking a word does not mean here at all a violation of the language which would lead to a phenomenological way, directly to the things themselves in objective evidence, immediate and prelinguistic. The breaking of the word is here a kind of des-death to every word as a word and that is intended. Or, put another way, breaking a word refers to the constitutive finitude of all that constituted representative of any relationship between words and things, as all-round experience. The glare of the link between language and death can not be anything other than the intuition of mortality is characteristic of the extent that the mortality is already posted on the finitude of language itself: "Breaking meant here: the word resounding return to soundproof, beyond where it is intended: to the sound of silence. " 27
Notes:
15 Heidegger, M. (1957-1958), "The essence of speech" in the Way to Language, op. cit., pp. 141-194.
16 Op. , p. 149.
17 Op. cit., P. 152.
18 Op. cit., P. 167.
19 Op. cit., P. 158.
20 Especially in the 1935 essay "The Origin of the Work of Art" in Art and poetry ed, Mé xico, FCE, 1958.
21 Especially in the 1936 essay Hölderlin and the essence of poetry ed, Barcelona, \u200b\u200bAnthropos, 1989.
22 "The essence of speech," op cit, p. 171 .
23 Op. cit., P. 172.
24 Op. cit., p. 173.
25 op.cit., p. 192.
26 Op. cit ., p. 193.
27 Op. cit ., p. 194.
Fragments taken from Jorge Larrosa. The experience of reading. Mexico. Fondo de Cultura Economica. 2007, pp. 12-20 and 68-73.
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